Without ties with India, the Pakistani people may not have human security or a successful economy

At its 36th meeting on 27 December 2021, the Pakistan National Security Committee (NSC) approved the country’s “first ever” National Security Policy (NSP). Seven years in the making, the NSP is designed to be a “Comprehensive National Security Framework” and covers a five-year period from 2022-26. NSP seeks to ensure “the safety, security and dignity of Pakistani citizens”. To achieve this goal, it puts “economic security” at its “core”. In addition to economic and military issues, the NSP also covers issues related to foreign policy, terrorism, water security and demography. Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan, who chaired the NSC meeting, called the NSP’s approval a “historic moment”. The Pakistani cabinet approved the NSP on 28 December.

Marks a fundamental change

It is essential that a public version of the NSP has not yet been released. According to a press release from the Pakistani Prime Minister’s Office, this will be done “in due course”. However, Pakistan’s national security adviser Moeed W. Yusuf said on December 28 that it would be done within a week to 10 days. Should it be released soon, it would show that a kind of consensus has been reached between the elected government and the Pakistani army on the NSP. However, a delay may be a sign of remaining difficulties.

But even though the army is apparently on board, the question is whether it is willing to turn Pakistan away, in the true sense, from being a tough military security state to a state where the military competes for resources with other state institutions and the final decision is made by the political leadership. The logic of giving priority to the economy is that national policies will be geared towards development through resource allocation. It would mark a fundamental change in the direction of Pakistan, for it would reduce the army’s demand for resources.

It’s the army first

The Pakistani army has always made first demands on the country’s revenue. It has never let light shine fully over the defense spending. For that matter, it also does not allow scrutiny of its large network of businesses and real estate for the benefit of its officers and men. From time to time, some officers have emphasized the importance of “geoeconomics,” but rarely has the Army shown any willingness to redirect resources from the defense to other areas. And it has convinced the majority of the people that there must be sacrifices for national defense because of enemies from outside, primarily India and internally.

More than 40 years ago, during the tenure of Pakistan’s President Zia-ul-Haq, a Pakistani who compared India to his own country told me that his country’s army controlled everything in the name of defense, but “what is it really, it defends beyond himself “? Despite the passage of time and the geopolitical global and regional transformation, the truth of my interlocutor’s claim still applies today. Thus, if the NSP is to mark a significant change in Pakistan’s systems and governance, the first step must be transparency in actual military spending and the settlement of what the brave Pakistani scholar Ayesha Siddiqa describes as “Mil.Inc.” It does not seem to be on the horizon.

An ‘India Occupation’

In the context of the NSP, the question that Pakistan must also ask itself is this: can it ever achieve human security for its people and put the country on the path of normality and growth without radically changing its India policy? As a product of the two-nation theory, Pakistan has defined its very identity – to put it roughly, but bluntly – thus: that is what India is not. Nearly 75 years since its inception, Pakistan continues its search for a positive identity that will allow the country to abandon its India occupation. Its so-called involvement in the ‘Kashmir case’ is part of its general negative approach to India. This deep-seated hostility has prevented it from adopting rational policies towards India. Rational approaches would have made it possible “legally” to adhere to its positions, but “practically” have ties to India in areas that would be in its national interest.

An example of its irrational approach is the stance it has taken on the Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) issue following the constitutional amendments of 5 August 2019. Pakistan could have maintained its stance on J&K and still traded with India as it was in the country’s interest . to do so. Instead, it decided to suspend the shortened commercial relationship that existed. Countries can use selective approaches to register protests. A sacrifice of interests is particularly useless where such a sacrifice does not yield results, as it has obviously not done so, from Pakistan’s point of view, on the J&K development after 2019.

While Pakistan’s ideology and way of thinking prevent it from developing realistic ties with India, it also has implications for its social development and the economic governance of the country, apart from draining resources from development to defense. Pakistan strives to become a society permeated by moderate Islamic faith. However, its security apparatus has actively sought to use Islamism against India. This has led to it becoming accustomed to violent sectarian groups and marginalizing progressive elements of civil society. The culture of Islamism is illustrated by the honor of the tomb of Mumtaz Qadri, the assassin of Punjab Governor Salman Taseer. It is astonishing that Qadri, who was executed for the crime of murdering someone he was obliged to protect, was praised by millions for serving the cause of Islam by killing Taseer, who was perceived as sympathetic to an accused blasphemy. There is another aspect. Islamist forces are also allied with feudal elements in the Pakistani political elite, and together they support hostile and irrational policies towards India, including in economic and commercial sectors.

China as anchor

The natural economic partner of a country like Pakistan is a big neighbor. This is especially the case at a time when economies are not barricaded, as some were for decades in the second half of the last century. Pakistan strongly refuses to open up trade with India and has looked to other economic and commercial partners, among whom China is by far the most important. The security relationship was anchored in the ties between China and Pakistan. Now Pakistan hopes China will offer its aid to transform its economy. It ensures that the mechanisms under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) play a crucial role through connectivity, port development, electricity generation and other investment. All of this can be of some help, but it can not be a substitute for being integrated with a large neighboring economy.

It can only happen with the opening of trade and connection with India. Over 25 years ago, Chinese President Jiang Zemin in a speech to the Pakistani Senate had talked about the need to temporarily shelve disputes so that they do not affect ties between states. He may have mentioned this in connection with Sino-South Asian ties, but these comments also applied to Pakistani approaches to its neighbors. But Jiang Zemin’s words were simply ignored by the Pakistanis. Today, when the regional and international context has completely changed, it is unlikely that President Xi Jinping will give Pakistan the same advice. However, it does not erode the correctness of Jiang Zemin’s views.

Thus, no matter what the NSP may say, the Pakistani people can have neither human security nor a successful economy without ties of cooperation with India. It is the Pakistani army and the political elite unwilling to have. NSP can therefore not change Pakistan’s unfortunate direction.

https://tittlepress.com/imran-khan/1418077/